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THE VALIDITY OF THE COIMON-LAW MARRIAGE
WHEN ENTERED INTO IN KENTUCKY, OR WHEN
ENTERED INTO IN ANOTHER STATE.
A recent decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, Hoff-

man v. Hoffman,' makes appropriate an investigation of the
validity of common-law marriages in this jurisdiction, both when
entered into in Kentucky and when entered into in another
state. In this case Dorothy Hoffman sought dower in the estate
of Emil Hoffman as his common-law widow. There was evidence
sufficient to establish a common-law marriage both in Kentucky
and Ohio, a status recognized in the latter state only. The claim
was allowed on the theory that the law of the state of performance determines the validity of a marriage. The position of the
court is undoubtedly sound, but the manner in which the validity
of the marriage arose suggests two problems which may confront
a state, such as Kentucky, which does not permit the commonlaw marriage. First, if there had been a marriage in Kentucky
only could dower have been awarded? Secondly, is there any
reason why Kentucky should not recognize, -for the purpose of
awarding dower, a common-law marriage if it is valid where
performed?
I.
Kentucky is clearly one of those states which denies validity
to a marriage entered into without benefit of ceremony by
present words of agreement as permitted at common law. This
position was first taken by statute and subsequently strengthened
by interpretive decisions. 2 The court in Estil v. Rogerss in 1886,
explicitly held that since the revision of the statutes in 1852 a
marriage not solemnized or contracted in the presence of an
authorized person or society was void. The general tone of this
language was reflected in the subsequent cases of Harris v.
5
Harris,4 in 1887, and Robinson v. Bedd,1
in 1897. Findings since
that time have rested their decisions on the foundation afforded
by these early cases. An isolation of the facts of these three
'-Ky.-, 146 S.W. (2d) 347 (1941).

'Ky. Statutes (Carroll's 1936) Sec. 2097. (This provision for
formal ceremony first appeared in the 1852 revision.)
:64 Ky. (1 Bush) 62 (1886).
'85 Ky. 49, 2 S.W. 549 (1887).
" 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1422, 43 S.W. 1435 (1897).
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cases will show some of the instances in which the validity or
invalidity of a common-law marriage may be decisive, and will
furnish a better understanding of their implications.
In the Estill case the common-law husband and wife lived
together for fifteen or more years. Upon the death of the wife a
contest arose in appointing an administrator. The court
appointed the wife's brother instead of her husband. The validity of the marriage arose in the Harris case in a contest between
issue of the union and the husband's next of kin as to who should
be preferred in inheriting the husband's property. In the
Robinson case the common-law wife sought to have money paid
over in advance by the executor for her use. Thus, the cases
which led to the traditional statement that "common-law marriages are not good in Kentucky" involved, not prosecutions for
bigamy, nor actions for divorce, nor claims for dower, as might
well have been expected, but instead a determination of
incidental property rights and the legitimacy of children.0
Paralleling these common-law marriage cases in Kentucky
are a group of decisions dealing with the related problem of presuming a formal marriage; in the absence of positive proof, from
evidence of cohabitation and reputation. 7 McDaniel v. McDanie8 is illustrative of these cases. No marriage license was
available for proof of the marriage in this case, nor was there a
recordation of the license, because county records had been
The participating minister
destroyed previously by fire.
testified that he had no recollection of performing a ceremony,
although some thirty years had elapsed and he had moved away
from the community. The court found its way out of this maze
of conflicting evidence by presuming a marriage from the
evidence of cohabitation and reputation in the community, saying that the usual way of proving marriage is by general
reputation, cohabitation and acknowledgement. Apparently
this case, and the type it illustrates, stems from the language

IIt is interesting to note that the legitimacy of children is not
a problem involved in informal marriages in Kentucky because of
Ky. Statutes (Carroll's 1936) Sec. 2098 which legitimizes the issue of
all marriages excepting those that are incestuous or between black
and whites.

7
McDaniel v. McDaniel, 212 Ky. 833, 280 S.W. 145 (1926); Scott
v. Scott, 200 Ky. 153, 252 S.W. 1019 (1923); Powell v. Calver, 5 Ky.
L. Rep. 769 (1884); Ewing v. Bibb, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 654 (1871).
8212 Ky. 833, 280 S.W. 145 (1926) supra n. 7
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used in two early Kentucky cases, Ewing v. BibbO and Powell v.
Calver'0 . The Ewing case involved the validity of a slave marriage entered into prior to revision of the statutes in 1852.
The court said, although it was not necessary to reach the
decision, that although evidence of mere cohabitation and
reputation would not support a prosecution for bigamy, evidence
of such circumstances would so far render a marriage valid as to
make a subsequent marriage void. The Powell case went even
further and proceeded on the theory that such evidence
established a prima facie case of marriage.
Though these cases are not as strong on their facts as the
language used would lead one to believe, Professor Madden
points out that this type of decision is not unusual." He asserts
that where there is evidence of reputation in the community,
combined with cohabitation, the presumption of marriage is
strong. If the jurisdiction recognizes the common-law marriage,
such will be presumed. If not, a ceremonial marriage is
presumed.
These cases cannot be said to contravene the common-law
marriage cases because the evidence which raises the presumption may be overcome by the introduction of positive proof, but
an assumption or two will show that any apparent distinction
between the two types of cases is largely theoretical. Assuming
that no positive evidence of marriage exists (no certificate or
recordation of license) one who claims as a husband or wife may
proceed to have his case established in one of two ways. First,
he may assert that he cohabited with his alleged spouse under a
mere agreement of marriage. Secondly, he may assert that he
was formally married, but that he can prove it only by showing cohabitation and reputation. If he proceeds on the first
theory, his claim will not be recognized in Kentucky. If he
proceeds on the second theory hle should have his claim
recognized unless there is positive evidence to overcome the
presumption raised by evidence of cohabitation and reputation.
The absence of such evidence, i.e. a marriage certificate, recorded
license, testimony of participating minister or official, etc. has
been assumed. Therefore it would seem that the one who
'70 Ky. (7 Bush) 654 (1871) supra n. 7
5 Ky. L. Rep. 769 (1884) supra n. 7
Madden, Domestic Relations (1931) 66 et. seq.
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contests the claim of marriage is simply at the mercy of the
claimant's theory of his case. While it is always possible to
show perjury, or to show that the r~putation was for a commonlaw and not a ceremonial marriage, the former is at best an
unlikely possibility. The latter is even more improbable for the
repute in an average community would be that the parties were
married and not that they were married in a particularmanner.
The distinction made in the cases, and pointed out by Madden, is sound. It is the difference between a concept of substantive law and a principle of evidence. Moreover, the distinction may well have a basis in public policy, for ceremonial marriages are more desirable than informal ones, and the state
should presume the moral rather than the immoral. Nevertheless, any rationalization of the status of the common-law marriage in Kentucky should be made with the idea firmly in mind
that little practical difference can be shown between a case which
recognizes a common-law marriage, and a case which recognizes
a marriage presumed from evidence of cohabitation and
reputation.
If the interpretation placed on the "cohabitation and
reputation" cases be tenable, it seems to be the only method by
which the accepted interpretation of Kentucky's attitude toward
the common-law marriage can be questioned. In some instances
a state's marriage statute is construed as directory rather than
mandatory, with a resulting recognition to marriages which
merely fail to conform to the explicit wording of the statute.' 2
Such a possibility has been suggested for the non-age provision
of the Kentucky marriage statute, 13 but the wording of the
formality provision itself, as well as the language of the cases,
does not permit of this construction when the statute is applied
to common-law marriages.
II.
It is well established that the law of the state where the
marriage is entered into determines is validity. 14 The instant
'-Id.at 49.
"Town Hall, Marriage Below the Statutory Age-Effect of Cohabitation After Arriving at That Age (1935) 24 Ky. L. J. 75, 79.

"Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935) Sec. 121; Stumberg, Conflict of
Laws (1937) 255; Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) Sec. 121;
Francis Deak, Recent Developments Concerning Marriage (1927) 27
Mich. L. Rev. 389, at 392 et. seq.
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case reiterates Kentucky's adherence to this doctrine. 15 There
are, however, two exceptions. First, if the marriage is "contrary
to the law of nature of Christian countries" it will not be
recognized though valid where entered into. 16 Secondly, a
marriage manifestly against the public policy of the state need
not be recognized even if entered into abroad. 17
Into the first category fall incestuous' 8 and polygamous
marriages.' 9 The application of this exception is largely
academic for a Christian people do not recognize such marriages
even in the first instance. In other words, if the state of
performance does not consider an incestuous or polygamous
marriage valid, the problem of subsequent recognition by a
second state will not arise, or at least the question will arise
infrequently.
Into the second category fall miscegenous marriages and
20
such others as are clearly against the public policy of the state.
A variance in policy among the several states is reflected in the
application of this second exception. For instance, in the
states of the deep South marriages between blacks and whites are
so against the policy that they are not recognized even though
entered into in a state which does allow them.2 1 The reverse is
true of those sections of the country which do not have a
particular race problem.
Marriages forbidden because of consanguinity are within
the second category it would seem, 22 but because this type of
'Hoffman v. Hoffman, -Ky.-, 146 S.W. (2d) 347, 348 (1941)
supra n. 1; Hopkins County Coal Co. v. Williams, 219 Ky. 156, 292
S.W. 1088 (1927); Scott v. Scott, 200 Ky. 153, 252 S.W. 1019 (1923)

supra n. 7.
1 In Re Miller's Estate, 239 Mich. 455, 214 N.W. 428, 430 (1927);
commented on (1928) 26 Mich. L. Rev. 327.
'IMisenhelder v. C. & N. W. Ry., 171 Minn. 20, 213 N.W. 32
(1927), commented on (1928) 26 Mich. L. Rev. 327; Commonwealth
v. Graham, 157 Mass. 73, 31 N.E. 706 (1891); Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws (1927) Sec. 114
"United States v. Rodgers, 109 Fed. 866 (1901) (For a criticism
of the case and the doctrine which has resulted from it see: Beale,
Conflict of Laws (1935) Sec. 133.1.
Dannelli v. Dannelli, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 51 (1868).

Wilson v. Cook, 256 II. 460, 100 N.E. 222 (1912); Lando v.

Lando, 112 Minn. 257, 127 N.W. 1125 (1910); Lanham v. Lanham,
136 Wis. 360, 117 N.W. 787 (1908).
'State v. Tutty, 41 Fed. 753 (1890); Dupre v. Boulard, 10 La.

Ann. 411 (1855); State v. Dennedy, 76 N.C. 251 (1877).
;In Re Miller's estate, op. cit. supra n. 16; Johnson v. Johnson,
57 Wash. 89, 106 Pac. 500 (1910)
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marriage does not in and of itself shock the public conscience it
becomes necessary to find a policy for or against. Courts faced
with the problem of finding a policy have looked to the local
marriage statute. If the statute is a penal one it is usually
indicative of an attitude sufficiently strong to bring the exception into play, although this may not always be the case. 28 Also
if the statute is not a penal one, but contains the word void this
may be sufficient to show a policy against recognition.2 4 On the
other hand, even a strongly worded statute may not represent a
strong policy against recognition if the marriage is valid where
performed.
Kentucky courts seldom if ever discuss the policy of the
marriage statute and herein lies the real difficulty with respect to
recognizing common-law marriages entered into abroad. There
should be little question that the attitude is clearly drawn
against incestuous, polygamous and miseegenous marriages in
this state. The policy is not so strong against marriages of close
blood. 25 but what is the feeling toward common-law marriages?
They are invalid if entered into within the state and valid if
recognized in the state of performance. Putting it more
abstractly, the policy in the first instance is sufficiently strong
to prevent recognition, while in the second instance the policy is
not strong enough to prevent recognition. In each instance the
policy flows from the same statute, although this does not
necessarily make the policy the same.
This difference in policy is not as unexplainable as a
dispassionate analysis would make it appear. Two forces are
really in conflict. The first is a reluctance to permit informal
marriages; the second is a desire to let marriages exist when they
are validly created. It is desirable that both forces operate.
One prevents promiscuous use of the marriage status, a thing in
which the state has a vital interest. The other protects the
parties to a valid relationship.
By way of recapitulation it has been shown that Kentucky
does not recognize the common-law marriage either by statute or
I Garcia v. Garcia,

25 S.D. 645, 127 N.W. 586 (1910).
31 Ore. 480, 50 Pac. 802 (1897); State
v. Yoder, 113 Minn. 503, 130 N.W. 10 (1911) (dictum); Estate of
Scull, 183 Pa. 625, 39 Atl. 16 (1898); Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 244,
10 S.W. 305 (1889).
'Stevenson v. Gray, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 193 (1856).

McLennan v. McLennan,
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decisions. She does allow proof of a ceremonial marriage by way
of presumption arising from evidence of cohabitation and
reputation, a distinction which is both sound and explainable in
policy. If the marriage is entered into in a state which does
recognize common-law marriages it will be given effect here.
Moreover, a common-law marriage is apparently not so against
the public policy of the state as to make it come within an exception to the general rule. The court might cast considerable light
on the problem involved by discussing directly, rather than
inferentially, the policy toward common-law marriages entered
into in a state where they are valid.
W. L. MATTHEWS, JR.

